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Abstract 
We examine the empirical role of information flows and institutional quality in explaining the 
capital flows per capita across countries, and their role in explaining the so-called Lucas 
paradox -low levels of capital flows to poor countries. The findings of this paper suggest that 
countries with better institutions and high information flows receive high capital flows, and 
information flows also provides a partial explanation to the Lucas Paradox. The latter result is 
significant even after controlling for institutional quality, financial openness and human capital 
differences across countries, and using instrumental variable for information flows. This paper 
also examines the indirect effects of institutional quality on capital flows per capita through its 
impact on information flows and finds that countries with better institutional quality have 
higher levels of information flow. Accounting this indirect effect is economically important 
and papers that do not account for this indirect effect of institutions on capital flows per capita 
would underestimate the effect of institutions on capital flows per capita. Findings of this paper 
suggest that relatively poorer countries should improve their institutional quality and increase 
their access to worldwide information and promote investments in communications 
infrastructure to attract long-term capital flows.   
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1. Introduction 
The seminal paper of Lucas (1990) questioned why capital does not flow from rich to 
poor economies even though the neoclassical theory suggests that relatively higher marginal 
rates of returns in poor countries should attract higher capital flows to these countries. Among 
many other explanations, differences in institutional quality and political risk are put forward 
and strongly emphasized. In a seminal paper, Alfaro et al. (2008), AKV hereafter, found that 
differences in institutional quality across countries is the leading explanation for the Lucas 
Paradox. This result (institutional quality being the major factor explaining the Lucas paradox) 
is weakened by Azemar and Desbordes (2013), when they use a natural logarithm of capital 
flows per capita as the dependent variable rather than the level of capital flows per capita. On 
the other hand, Slesman et al. (2015), by using a threshold regression model, show a partial 
explanation for the Lucas paradox. They find that capital flows have positive effects on 
economic growth if and only if countries have high quality of institutional settings. In other 
words, their work finds that countries require a threshold level of institutional quality by which 
capital flows have a positive effect on economic growth1.    
Beyond the factors mentioned above, a number of papers studied the relationship 
between information flows and the foreign direct investment (FDI), in general terms capital 
flows (see e.g., Portes et al., 2001; Choi et al., 2014; Blonigen and Piger, 2014). In particular, 
it has been argued that the communication and information tools provide a better access to 
information and minimize the negative effects of asymmetric information. Portes et al. (2001) 
                                                          
1 There are extensive set of papers analysing the factors that explain the capital flows across countries and some 
of those factors found to be important are the differences in human capital (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007), financial 
openness (Reinhardt et al., 2013) and domestic fundamentals (Mody et al., 2001), level of moral hazard (Gertler 
and Rogoff, 1990; Sarno and Taylor, 1999), serial default levels (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004), and information 
frictions (Portes and Rey, 2005), among many other factors. 
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suggest that information flows (by using telephone traffic as a proxy for information flows) 
could mitigate the information asymmetry and could lead to an increased financial trade. 
Reynolds et al. (2004) also find a positive relationship between the level of telecommunications 
infrastructure and FDI suggesting that such investment on infrastructure increases the returns 
to FDI. Similarly, Francois and Manchin (2013) find that low institutional quality and 
infrastructure in the south limits their trade levels. In a recent paper, Blonigen and Piger (2014) 
analyze an extensive list of potential determinants of FDI and find that the host country’s 
communication infrastructure (measured by the number of phone subscribers, internet users 
and computers) affects FDI decisions. Recently, Choi et al. (2014) find that the internet use 
mitigates the information asymmetry between countries and increases the volume of cross-
border portfolio flows between the United States and other countries. All of the above 
mentioned papers conclude that information flows increase FDI (capital flows) through 
increasing productivity and mitigating the asymmetric information. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, neither the aforementioned papers nor the related literature examine whether the 
levels of communications infrastructure and information flows might explain the Lucas 
Paradox or not. This paper is, therefore, a contribution to the literature in this respect. 
It has been long established that the infrastructural development levels of countries also 
play a significant and positive role in their economic growth (see, e.g., Easterly and Levine, 
1997). However, development processes of countries through infrastructure growth are shaped 
by their political and institutional settings (see e.g., Henisz, 2002; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003) 
where the economic returns to infrastructure investments are relatively higher in countries with 
better institutions (see e.g., Straub, 2011 for an extensive review of the mediating effects of 
political and institutional settings of countries on the economic returns to infrastructure). Even 
though there exists a theoretical and empirical literature examining the link between 
infrastructural development and economic growth (see e.g., Calderon and Serven, 2004 for a 
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review of theoretical and empirical links between infrastructural development and economic 
growth), the mechanisms through which infrastructure shapes aggregate economic 
performance has not been examined. In this paper, we examine some of these potential links. 
Firstly, we examine the relevance of information flows for the cross-country variation in capital 
flows per capita. Secondly, we also test the impact of institutional quality on information flows 
(e.g., Gillanders, 2014 finds that countries with better institutional quality have higher 
infrastructural development), and its indirect effect on capital flows per capita through its 
impact on information flows. This latter channel might also provide an additional mechanism 
for the institutions’ effect on long-term economic development (see e.g., seminal papers of 
Acemoglu, 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004). Hence, this paper will also contribute to the literature to 
uncover some of the mechanisms through which both institutions and information flows affect 
capital flows and economic growth.  
To test the role of communications infrastructure and information flows, we consider 
the information flows component from the KOF Index of Globalization. We find that the 
countries with high levels of information flows, which measures the level of country’s 
openness to global information and communications infrastructure level, attract higher capital 
flows. Furthermore, we also find that the information flows provide a partial explanation to the 
Lucas Paradox. This result is significant even after we control for institutional quality proxies, 
human capital, capital flow restrictions, and asymmetric information and with the use of 
different sample sizes. In addition to this, we also consider the possibility that the information 
flows may be endogenous and we used the instrumental variable estimation techniques, and 
the results are remained to be significant after controlling for the potential endogeneity of the 
information flows variable. We also find that the institutional quality and financial openness 
are the other determinants that are found to be significant in most of the specifications where 
countries with better institutional quality and the ones that are financially more open attract 
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higher capital flows. Finally, we find that the institutions have an indirect effect on capital 
flows per capita through their effect on information flows. This indirect effect of institutions 
on capital flows per capita is roughly equal to its direct effect highlighting the economic 
relevance of this indirect link. To put it differently, if the empirical specifications do not 
account for this indirect effect of institutions on capital flows per capita through their effect on 
information flows, they would underestimate the effect of institutions on capital flows per 
capita and therefore its effect on long-term economic development and growth.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide the dataset used in 
our analysis and relevant literature. Section 3 offers the empirical strategy. Section 4 provides 
empirical results with different specifications and robustness analysis. Finally, Section 5 
concludes.  
2. Data and literature review 
Our dependent variable is the average inflows of portfolio equity and direct investment 
per capita in 2005 U.S. prices. Similar to the AKV paper, we use the average inflows to capture 
the long-run effects of the various explanations of the Lucas Paradox. Our period of analysis 
is between 1982 and 2011. Before averaging the data over the study period, levels of capital 
inflows are calculated by first-differencing the updated stocks of portfolio equity and direct 
investment variables from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Then the levels of capital flows are 
divided by population and deflated by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) levels to bring the 
values into per capita in 2005 U.S. prices. The population data is obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators2.  
                                                          
2 World Development Indicators data set does not provide data for Taiwan, hence the population figure for Taiwan is 
obtained from the World Economic Outlook. 
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We consider the information flows component from the KOF Index of Globalization 
(Dreher, 2006 and Dreher et al., 2008). KOF Index of Globalization has been used extensively 
in the literature to examine the impact of globalization on health outcomes (see e.g., Bergh and 
Nilsson, 2010a), inequality (see e.g., Dreher and Gaston, 2008; Bergh and Nilsson, 2010b) and 
economic growth (see e.g., Gurgul and Lach, 2014), and in this paper, we use the information 
flows component to examine its impact on the FDI. This component is measured in terms of 
access to the internet, TV and foreign press products. In particular, it is calculated by using the 
data on the number of internet users (per 100 people), the share of households with a television 
set, and the sum of exports and imports in newspapers and periodicals (as a percentage of 
GDP). This component measures the potential flow of ideas and images across the countries, 
hence serves as a proxy for country’s openness to global information and also its investment to 
telecommunications infrastructure.  
We use the natural logarithm of initial income per capita for countries, which is 
obtained by taking the natural logarithm of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP per capita 
in 1982 from the Penn World Table 8.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015). One of the parameters of interest 
for this analysis is the coefficient obtained for the initial income per capita. A positive and 
significant coefficient on initial income per capita implies none of the variables considered in 
our analysis is able to explain the Lucas Paradox as there is relatively higher capital flows to 
rich countries. An insignificant coefficient on initial per capita implies that some of the 
variables provide a partial explanation to the Lucas Paradox since there is no significant 
relationship between capital flows and initial income per capita after controlling for these 
factors. Finally, a negative coefficient on initial income per capita after the inclusion of some 
factors would suggest that these variables are able to provide a full explanation to the Lucas 
Paradox since capital now flows to poorer countries after the inclusion of factors into the 
analysis.  
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We also use various control variables in our analysis. Institutional setting of countries 
has been one of the main determinants of the FDI (see e.g., Alfaro et al., 2008; Buchanan et 
al., 2012, among many others). We use the average of six components of the World Governance 
Indicators (WGIs) from the World Bank (i.e., voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) as an 
institutional quality proxy (Kaufmann et al., 2013). Another factor that have been found to be 
important is the financial openness (see e.g., Reinhardt et al., 2013; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). 
To account for financial openness, we use the restriction to capital mobility proxy from Chinn 
and Ito (2008), which is constructed as an index to capture the restrictions of financial 
transactions based on IMF data. This index is normalized to range between 0 and 1 where the 
higher score represent more financial openness3. Human capital is also found to be an important 
factor in attracting FDI flows since higher human capital increases the returns to investment 
(see e.g., Cleeve et al., 2015). In order to account for the human capital differences across 
countries, we use average years of total schooling for population aged 15 and over as a proxy 
for human capital from Barro and Lee (2010). Finally, to account for asymmetric information 
across countries, we calculate the distantness measure as a proxy for the asymmetric 
information similar to that of AKV. Distantness measure is the weighted averages of distances 
from the main cities of a particular country to the main cities of other countries where we use 
the GDP shares as weights. GDP shares are coming from the World Economic Outlook data 
                                                          
3 An alternative measure for financial openness is the restrictions component from the KOF index of 
globalization. However, the correlation coefficient between the Chinn-Ito financial openness index and 
restrictions component from the KOF index of globalization is positive and significant, i.e., 0.82, for the set of 
countries used in our analysis and the qualitative findings of this paper are not affected by the use of either 
measure of financial openness. Among the two measures of financial openness, we use the Chinn-Ito index due 
to its larger set of country coverage. 
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set. On the other hand, bilateral distances between main cities of particular country to main 
cities of other countries come from Head et al. (2010). Distantness measure is also used as a 
proxy for market access (MA) as countries that are close to other high-income countries, tend 
to have higher income (see e.g., Redding and Venables, 2004; Liu and Meissner, 2015), with 
access to the export market found to be the one of the main factors behind this relationship (see 
Bosker and Garretsen, 2012). In a recent study, Blanco (2012) finds that the surrounding market 
potential has a positive significant effect on net FDI for the Latin American countries. 
In this paper, we use two sets of samples. We use the sample of AKV to replicate their 
findings with the inclusion of the information flows variable, and we also use the large sample 
which considers the countries that have a population more than one million over the period of 
our analysis. Table 1 offers the descriptive statistics for the AKV and large samples4. We 
adjusted the institutional quality and information flows variables to range between zero and ten 
to allow comparison between these two factors. Higher institutional quality scores represent 
better governance and institutions, and the higher information flows score implies that a 
country’s openness to global information and telecommunications infrastructure is higher. 
Average inflows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita have a mean of 738 and 
597 for large and AKV sample countries, respectively. However, countries in the AKV sample 
has higher mean values for the initial GDP per capita, schooling, institutional quality and 
information flows variables compared to the mean values of the large sample. Hence, analysis 
conducted for these two sets of samples might shed a different light into the explanation of the 
Lucas Paradox5.  
<Insert Table 1 approximately here> 
                                                          
4 See the Appendix Table A1 for the list of countries used in our analysis. 
5 See the Appendix Table A2 for definitions and sources of variables.  
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 Before conducting our empirical analysis, Figs. 1 and 2 plot the relationship between 
the natural logarithm of average inflows of portfolio equity and direct investment (capital 
flows) per capita and average information flows for the AKV and large samples, 
respectively6. With both samples, there is a strong positive linear relationship between the 
natural logarithm of capital flows per capita and average information flows, which confirms 
the use of log-level regression analysis (see the next section for the empirical strategy)7. In 
the following section, we investigate whether this relationship continue to hold after 
controlling for various variables and accounting for potential endogeneity of institutional 
quality and information flows.  
<Insert Fig. 1 approximately here> 
<Insert Fig. 2 approximately here> 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
In this paper, we use regression analysis based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of the natural logarithm of the average inflows of portfolio equity and direct 
                                                          
6 Note that the information flows variable is normalized across the whole panel (i.e., across the countries and 
years) where the observation in the panel with the highest value is assigned 10, and the remaining ones get 
normalized scores as follows: (Actual value / Highest value) x 10. This rescaling of information flows variable 
has no effect on the cross-country variation since the proportional differences between countries with the actual 
or re-scaled values are the same. However, re-scaling of information flows variable allows us to compare 
different components’ contribution in explaining the variation in capital flows in our empirical analysis. 
7 See Figs. 3 and 4 in the Appendix, which plot the relationship between the capital flows per capita (without 
taking the natural logarithm of this variable) and average information flows for the AKV and large samples, 
respectively. Note that the relationship between two variables is not linear with outliers when we do not take the 
natural logarithm of capital flows.  
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investment per capita on the natural logarithm of the initial income per capita, average 
information flows, institutional quality, and other control variables. Regression analysis could 
be written as:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔Fi = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔Yi + 𝛾1INFi + 𝛾2INSi + 𝜹𝐗 + 𝜀𝑖    
  
where Fi is the average inflows of portfolio equity and direct investment per capita between 
1982 and 2011, Yi is the initial income per capita (i.e., GDP per capita in 1982), INFi is average 
information flows levels over the same period, INSi is the average of six components of the 
WGIs over the same period, 𝐗 is the set of control variables that includes the average financial 
openness, the logarithm of the average years of schooling (average years of schooling for 
population aged 15 and over during the same period), and average distantness over the same 
period, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term.  
 In particular, we are interested whether the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1982 is 
significant or not in order to offer a potential explanation for the Lucas Paradox. The positive 
significance of the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1982 suggests the presence of the paradox 
meaning that more capital flows to rich countries. Furthermore, we analyse which of the 
variables (e.g., institutional quality and/or information flows) makes the logarithm of GDP per 
capita in 1982 insignificant (negative and significant) when included, hence providing a partial 
(full) explanation for the Lucas Paradox.  
We first start our estimations with the OLS specification. However, an important 
concern of the capital flows literature is the endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. 
To account for the potential endogeneity of the information flows variable, we instrument the 
information flows with the average level of information flows in neighbouring countries (see 
e.g., Bergh and Nilsson, 2014 where they use a similar instrumental variable for globalization 
index). A good instrument variable needs to be correlated with endogenous variable but should 
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not be correlated with the dependent variable beyond its effect on endogenous variable. Using 
neighbouring countries’ average outcome for a given variable has been used in the literature as 
an instrument and found to be a valid approach (e.g., Balgati et al. (2009) use trade openness 
of neighbouring countries as an instrumental variable for trade openness). Hence, we use 
average information flows in neighbouring countries as an instrumental variable for 
information flows variable. Similarly, we also consider the potential endogeneity of the 
institutions. Hence, we also implement two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations by using the 
logarithm of historical European settler mortality rates as an instrumental variable for 
institutions (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001).8 However, reliability of this instrumental variable for 
institutions was criticized due to data benchmarking used in obtaining the settler mortality for 
some countries and reliability of the data sources (see Albouy, 2012 for further details). In a 
recent paper, Kelejian et al. (2013) found that the level of institutions in bordering countries 
affects the institutional development of a country after controlling for various control variables. 
Hence, we also use the average level of institutions in adjacent countries as instrumental 
variable for institutions.   
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) argue that the European colonizers faced a different disease environment, which 
led them to settle (not to settle) and set good (extractive) institutions where settler mortality rates were low (high). 
They find that the European settler mortality rates shaped different institutions which persisted over time but these 
rates were not correlated with the income per capita of countries. Hence, the European settler mortality rates are 
considered to be a valid instrument for institutions. Some other papers that used European settler mortality as 
instrumental variable for institutions are Rodrik et al. (2004), Bosker and Garretsen (2009), Haggard and Tiede 
(2011), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Pinar (2015) among many others.  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Baseline Estimations 
Table 2 presents the results when we replicate the AKV results with the inclusion of 
the information flows variable. In the first column, we present the results when we only include 
the initial per capita in the regressions which suggests that capital flows to rich countries (i.e., 
the Lucas paradox). In the lines with the AKV estimations, we add institutional quality in 
column (2) of Table 2 where we find that the institutional quality is positively and significantly 
associated with capital flows. After the inclusion of the institutions, the coefficient on initial 
income per capita drops significantly from 1.209 to 0.459, but it is still significant at the 1% 
level. This drop in coefficient on initial income per capita after the inclusion of institutions is 
something that is expected econometrically since initial income per capita and institutions are 
highly correlated with each other (see e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004 for the 
relationship between institutions and long-run economic development).  
<Insert Table 2 approximately here> 
In the third column of Table 2, we report the results when institutional quality is 
instrumented with the European settler mortality. We have lower number of countries with the 
instrumental variable estimation as not all countries have data for settler mortality rates. The 
first stage F-statistic is also well above 10, a cut-off value set by the weak instruments literature 
(Stock and Yogo, 2005), suggesting that the European settler mortality is a strong instrument 
for institutions. Qualitatively, the results obtained through 2SLS estimates are similar to those 
obtained with the OLS estimation. However, after the severe criticisms to the settler mortality 
data by Albouy (2012), we also use average institutional quality of bordering countries as an 
alternative instrumental variable for institutions. Column (4) of Table 2 reports the results when 
we use this alternative instrumental variable for institutions where the results are roughly 
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similar to those obtained with the OLS estimation (see column (2) of Table 2)9. In column (5), 
we include additional control variables, namely schooling, financial openness and distantness 
measure. After controlling for these factors, institutional quality is still a significant factor 
explaining the variation in capital flows. In all these specifications (i.e., findings that are 
reported in columns (2)-(5)), both institutional quality and initial income per capita is 
significant at the 1% level, confirming the findings of Azemar and Desbordes (2013), which 
suggest that the Lucas paradox is not explained when log-log specification is used for the 
estimations (i.e., when the relationship between the natural logarithm of average capital flows 
per capita and the natural logarithm of the initial GDP per capita is considered).  
In column (6) of Table 2, we now include information flows component from the KOF 
Index of Globalization by excluding the institutional quality from our analysis since 
institutional quality is the only significant variable beyond initial GDP per capita in explaining 
variation in capital flows and we would like to examine the effect of inclusion of information 
flows into the analysis. We find that information flows affect capital flows positively and 
significantly at the 1% level. Furthermore, when information flows variable is included to the 
regressions, initial GDP per capita becomes insignificant. In other words, not only information 
flows variable is important determinant for capital flows but also it provides a partial 
explanation for the Lucas paradox10. Finally, in column (7), we include institutions, 
information flows and other control variables. Both coefficients on information flows and 
institutional quality are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting both factors explain 
the variation in capital flows. Both of the coefficients on institutions and information flows in 
column (7) decrease when both variables are controlled for when it is compared to cases when 
                                                          
9 Note that the first stage F-statistic is 51.72, which suggests that average institutional quality of bordering 
countries is a strong instruments for institutions. See also Kelejian et al. (2013) where they find that the level of 
institutions in bordering countries affects the institutional development after controlling for various control 
variables.  
10 For a full explanation to the Lucas paradox, one should expect that the sign of coefficient on initial income 
per capita to be negative and significant.  
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either institutions or information is not controlled for (i.e., coefficient on institutions in column 
(5) and coefficient on information flows in column (6)). Econometrically, decreases in the sizes 
on both coefficients when both institutions and information flows are not surprising due to the 
relationship between information flows and institutions. For instance, infrastructural 
development of countries are shaped by the institutional settings (see e.g., Henisz, 2002; 
Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003) where countries with better institutions tend to have higher 
infrastructural development (see, e.g., Gillanders, 2014). In other words, the findings are in the 
lines with the information flows being a mediator in the link from institutions to capital flows. 
In other words countries with better institutions have more information flows, but institutions 
also matter when information flows are controlled for. Finally, when we provide the estimates 
of information flows (without controlling for institutions) and institutional quality (without 
controlling for information flows), the decrease in the R-square value is relatively the same 
when we moved from the case when we controlled for both variables. Hence, the contribution 
of each component to the explanatory power is roughly the same. In this sub-section, we will 
test the indirect effect of institutions on capital flows through its effect on information flows 
but we first examine the effects of institutions and information flows on capital flows per capita 
when more countries are included into the analysis.    
We now replicate the regression analysis to examine whether the relationship between 
information flows (institutions) and capital flows still holds after the inclusion of more 
countries into the analysis. Table 3 represents the findings when we use the large sample with 
the same estimation procedures used in respective columns of Table 2. In column (2) of Table 
3, when the institutional quality included in the regression, we find that the institutional quality 
is a determinant of capital flows, yet it does not explain the Lucas paradox as the coefficient 
on initial GDP per capita is positive and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, when the 
institutional quality is instrumented with the logarithm of the European settler mortality or 
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average institutional quality in bordering countries (see columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 for the 
findings when each respective instrumental variable for institutions is used), the coefficient on 
initial GDP per capita is still positive and significant. Similar to the findings of Table 2, when 
we include institutional quality and other control variables into the regression analysis, the 
coefficient on initial GDP per capita is still positive and significant at the 1% level (see column 
(5) of Table 3). Compared to the findings of Table 2, both schooling and financial openness 
enter to the regressions with expected signs and significantly suggesting that more capital flows 
to the countries where there is higher human capital and countries that are financially open. In 
column (6), when we include information flows to the analysis (but exclude the institutions 
variable), we find the coefficient on information flows is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, but the coefficient on initial GDP per capita becomes insignificant when information 
flows variable is included into the analysis. This suggests that the information flows variable 
provides a partial explanation to the Lucas paradox. Finally, in column (7), when we include 
both institutions and information flows to the analysis, both coefficients on institutions and 
information flows decrease compared to the cases when either institutions or information flows 
variable is not included into the regression analysis. As mentioned before, the reason why the 
sizes of the coefficients on institutions and information flows variables drop is that countries 
with better institutional quality tend to have higher information flows, and the findings are in 
the lines with the information flows being a mediator in the link from institutions to capital 
flows. 
<Insert Table 3 approximately here> 
To examine the relationship between the institutions and information flows, we regress 
information flows on institutions and initial income per capita. It is possible that countries with 
lower information flows might have a lower institutional quality and hence it is important to 
account for endogeneity problem. Therefore, we also report the findings when the institutional 
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quality is instrumented with average institutional quality in adjacent countries. In the lines with 
the literature, we also control for initial income per capita since it is likely that countries with 
better development levels have higher information flows. Table 4 demonstrates this 
relationship between information flows and institutions when the AKV and large samples are 
used. Columns (1) and (2) reports the results obtained with the OLS and 2SLS estimations with 
the AKV sample, respectively. The coefficients obtained with the OLS and 2SLS estimations 
on institutions is roughly the same where a unit increase in institutional quality leads to an 
increase in information flows by 0.46. On the other hand, when we get the results with the OLS 
and 2SLS estimations for the large sample (see the columns (3) and (4) for the results for each 
respective estimation), we find that the countries with the better institutions are associated with 
higher levels of information flows. In both cases, F-statistics in the first stage regressions are 
way above the cut-off value suggesting that average institutional quality in bordering countries 
is a strong instrument for institutions. These findings are in the lines with the literature where 
the countries with better institutions tend to have higher information flows and better 
infrastructure levels.  
<Insert Table 4 approximately here> 
 Since we obtained the direct and indirect effects of institutions (through its effect on 
information flows) and direct effects of information flows on capital flows per capita, we can 
provide some economic implications of these estimates. If we consider the point estimates in 
column (7) of Table 3 and column (4) of Table 4 as our estimates of various effects, a unit 
increase in institutional quality leads to an increase in log capital flows per capita by 0.44811. 
                                                          
11 The total effect of unit increase in institutional quality on capital flows per capita (i.e., 0.448) is obtained by 
the sum of indirect effect of institutions on capital flows per capita through its effect on information flows (i.e., 
0.528*0.402=0.212) and its direct effect (i.e., 0.236).  
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Indirect effect of institutions through information flows is almost as large as its direct effect 
on capital flows (i.e., the indirect and direct effects of institutions on log capital flows per 
capita are 0.212 and 0.236, respectively). In other words, the models that only considers the 
direct effect of institutions on capital flows per capita would underestimate the effect of 
institutions on capital flows per capita since these models do not account for the indirect 
impact of institutions on capital flows per capita. Whereas, a unit increase in information 
flows leads to an increase in log capital flows per capita by 0.402 (see column (7) of Table 3). 
Considering the coefficients obtained, a standard deviation increase in institutional quality 
(information flows) (i.e., 2.24 (1.95)) would lead to a roughly 1.00 (0.78) increase in log 
capital flows per capita (or 172% and 118% increase in capital flows per capita, respectively), 
suggesting that both of the components’ effect on capital flows per capita is economically 
large.  
4.2 Robustness analysis  
4.2.1 Unbundling institutions  
For the robustness of our findings and also to unbundle the effects of different 
institutional quality sub-components on capital flows, we use different institutional quality 
proxies in the estimation process. In particular, we include sub-components of WGI [i.e., 
voice and accountability (VA), government effectiveness (GE), political stability (PS), 
regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), and control of corruption (CC)] one at a time to 
account for institutional quality and test whether information flows is still significant after 
controlling for different institutional quality proxies. The results are presented in Table 5 
when we use the large sample12. Each column reports the results when respective sub-
                                                          
12 We conducted a similar application with the AKV sample. The results obtained with the AKV sample are 
very similar to the large sample case and are available upon request from authors.  
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component of the WGI is used as institutional quality proxy. Panel A of Table 5 reports the 
findings when only institutional quality proxy and initial GDP per capita variables are 
included into the regression analysis. Irrespective of the institutional quality proxy used, both 
coefficients on institutional quality and initial GDP per capita are positive and significant at 
the 1% level. All of the proxies used for institutional quality explain the cross-country 
variation in capital flows per capita, however, their inclusion does not solve the Lucas 
paradox (i.e., the coefficient on initial GDP per capita is still positive and significant after the 
inclusion of different institutional quality proxies). Panel B of Table 5 offers the findings 
when schooling, financial openness, and distantness measure are included into the analysis as 
control variables. Both coefficients on institutional quality and initial GDP per capita are 
significant at the 1% level after controlling for these factors. Moreover, schooling and 
financial openness enters to the regressions with the expected sign and significantly 
irrespective of the use of institutional quality proxy. Yet, the inclusion of additional control 
variables to the regressions do not offer any solution to the Lucas paradox. Finally, Panel C 
of Table 5 provides the results when information flows variable is included into the 
regressions. When the VA, RL and CC are used as a proxy for institutions, initial GDP per 
capita becomes insignificant after the inclusion of information flows to the analysis 
suggesting that information flows variable provides a partial solution to the Lucas paradox. 
However, when the GE, PS and RQ are used as a proxy for institutional quality, initial 
income per capita is still positive and significant after controlling for all factors suggesting 
that the Lucas paradox is not solved. Hence, the use of different proxies for institutional 
quality might lead to a different interpretation of the findings on whether information flows 
variable provides a partial solution to the Lucas paradox or not. Overall, when we look at the 
results obtained with the inclusion of all variables (i.e., panel C of Table 5), we find that the 
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financial openness, information flows and institutional quality (with the exception of VA) are 
the main determinants of capital flows per capita. 
<Insert Table 5 approximately here> 
We also examine the indirect effects of different institutional quality proxies on 
information flows where Panels A and B of Table 6 give the results obtained with the OLS 
and 2SLS estimations for the large sample when we use sub-components of WGI as a proxy 
for institutions, respectively. With different proxies for institutions, we find that the countries 
with the better institutions are associated with higher levels of information flows. With the 
2SLS estimations, F-statistics in the first stage regressions are way above 10 (i.e., cut-off 
value for weak instruments) suggesting that average institutional quality with respective 
proxy in bordering countries is a strong instrument for respective institutional quality proxy. 
With both estimation techniques, we find that both coefficients on institutional quality 
proxies and initial GDP per capita are positive and significant at the 1% level suggesting that 
the indirect effects of respective institutional quality proxy on capital flows per capita.  
<Insert Table 6 approximately here> 
By using the significant point estimates in Panel C of Table 5 and Panel B of Table 6 
as our estimates of direct and indirect effects of different institutional quality proxies on 
capital flows per capita, Table 7 offers the total effect of a unit increase in different 
institutional quality proxies on log capital flows per capita. Except the case of the RQ, the 
indirect effects of institutional quality proxies through their effect on information flows is 
greater than their direct effect, which highlights the importance of accounting for the indirect 
 
 
20 
 
effect of institution quality proxies on capital flows13. When we look at the economic effect 
of a unit increase in different institutional quality proxies on capital flows per capita, we find 
that a unit increase in RQ would provide the largest increase in capital flows per capita (i.e., 
64%). On the other hand, a unit increase in PS, GE, RL, CC, and VA lead to an increase in 
capital flows per capita by 56%, 55%, 50%, 41%, and 22%, respectively. Hence, the effect of 
different proxies on capital flows per capita differs and countries aiming to attract higher 
capital flows might prioritize to improve some aspects of institutional quality as their 
improvement leads to higher increases in capital flows.   
<Insert Table 7 approximately here> 
4.2.2 Unbundling information flows  
Our proxy for information flows variable is also obtained by combining three forms 
of information flows (i.e., internet users per 100 people, the share of households with a 
television set, and international newspapers traded as a percent of GDP) and the analysis so 
far does not identify the type of information flows that matters for capital flows. To do this, 
we unbundle the effects of different forms of information flows. Table 8 shows the results 
when we use the three types of information flows when we use the AKV and large samples, 
respectively. In these regression analysis, we also control for initial GDP per capita, 
institutions, human capital, and financial openness and the physical distance between 
countries. To allow comparison between the sub-components of information flows, we 
                                                          
13 The indirect effects of a unit increase in institutional quality proxies on capital flows is calculated by 
multiplying the respective coefficient on institutional quality proxy in Panel B of Table 6 with the coefficient on 
information flows in Panel C of Table 5. For instance, indirect effect of a unit increase in VA on capital flows 
per capita is obtained by 0.366 x 0.539.  
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standardize all types of information flows to range between 0 and 10 where higher values 
represent higher forms of information flows.  
<Insert Table 8 approximately here> 
In models (1) and (4), we used the internet usage proxy for information flows when 
we use the AKV and large samples, respectively. The coefficients on internet users is 
statistically significant at the 5% level with both samples, suggesting the importance of the 
number of internet users on capital flows per capita. This finding is in the lines with the 
evidence provided by Choi et al. (2014) where they showed that internet usage play a 
significant role in transaction of financial assets. In here, we also show that the level of 
internet users also plays an important role in determining the average inflows of portfolio 
equity and direct investment. In models (2) and (5), we include the proxy of the share of 
households with a television set in our analysis when the AKV and large samples are used, 
respectively.  We also find that the increase in television shares also leads to higher capital 
flows to countries and the coefficients on the television shares are statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5% levels when the AKV and large samples are used, respectively. Even though 
there is an extensive shift in how people obtain news over the recent years (i.e., there has 
been a massive increase in the use of digital platforms to obtain information), 
Papathanassopoulos et al. (2013) find that the most popular choice for news in all countries of 
their research remained to be the TV news, which may explain the relevance of information 
flows through this channel in explaining the variation in capital flows. Finally, when we 
include the international newspapers proxy in models (3) and (6) when the AKV and large 
samples are used, respectively, we find that variation in international newspapers circulated 
in the countries does not play a significant role in explaining the capital flows. Using the 
coefficient estimates from the large sample case, a unit increase in internet users proxy (the 
share of households with TV sets proxy) leads to an increase in log capital flows per capita 
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by 0.365 (0.176), which is equivalent to an increase in capital flows per capita by 44% (19%). 
Hence, the effect of information flows on capital flows per capita through internet is 
relatively larger than the effect through television, which is in the lines with the recent 
changes in the way that people obtain information through digital platforms.  
Finally, with respect to other control variables, we find that the coefficient on 
institutions variable is always significant and positive irrespective of the type of information 
flows and sample size, suggesting the importance of institutional quality differences across 
countries for capital flows per capita14. Except in one case (when the share of households 
with the television set is used in the AKV sample), we also find that initial GDP per capita is 
positive and significant suggesting that the capital flows to rich countries and none of the 
variables are able to offer any solution to the Lucas Paradox. Finally, when we use the large 
sample, we also find that human capital and financial openness differences across the 
countries also play a significant role in explaining the capital flows.  
4.2.3 Accounting for potential endogeity of information flows 
We also consider the possibility of information flows variable being an endogenous 
variable where we use the average level of information flows in neighbouring countries as an 
instrumental variable for information flows. Panel A of Table 9 shows the results when we 
include average information flows in neighbouring countries to the baseline specification 
with the information flows variable to examine whether the instrumental variable is 
correlated with the dependent variable (i.e., average per capita capital flows). This is 
                                                          
14 We should note that institutions also matter for three types of information flows where we find that countries 
with better institutions tend to have higher usage of internet and shares of households with television sets, and 
trade higher levels of international newspapers. Hence, institutions play a major role in access to information 
through different channels. 
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particularly important for the validity of the instrument variable since a valid instrumental 
variable should be correlated with endogenous variable but should not be correlated with the 
dependent variable. Since the information flows in neighbouring countries is not significantly 
explaining the capital flows per capita directly (Panel A of Table 9), there is no evidence that 
there is a direct effect of information flows in neighbouring countries on capital flows per 
capita other than its effect through information flows. Hence, average information flows in 
neighbouring institutions is a good instrumental variable for information flows. Panel B of 
Table 9 reports the second stage regression results when information flows variable is 
instrumented with the average information flows in neighbouring countries. With both 
sample, the coefficient on income per capita is positive but is not statistically significant, 
which suggests that information flows variable provides a partial explanation to the Lucas 
Paradox even after controlling for the potential endogeity of the information flows variable. 
Finally, Panel C of Table 9 gives the first stage regressions, where the information flows in 
neighbouring countries explain the information flows significantly when we use the AKV and 
large samples, respectively15.  
<Insert Table 9 approximately here> 
5. Conclusions 
Even though the relationship between communications infrastructure and the capital 
flows examined before, whether the levels of communications infrastructure and information 
flows might explain the Lucas Paradox or not has not been examined. In this paper, we 
                                                          
15 We also regressed the information flows variable on average information flows in neighbouring countries by 
excluding the income per capita variable. There is a strong and significant effect of average information flows in 
neighbouring countries on the information flows variable with R-square levels of 0.63 and 0.74 with the AKV 
and large samples, respectively.  
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examined whether the inclusion of information flows variable to the regressions provide an 
explanation to the Lucas paradox, and we find that the information flows, which measures the 
level of country’s openness to global information and communications infrastructure level, 
provide a partial explanation to the Lucas paradox. Information flows’ partial explanation to 
the Lucas paradox is in place after controlling for other variables, using different institutional 
quality proxies, and instrumenting information flows.  
Another important contribution of this paper was to examine the effect of institutions 
on information flows, and its consecutive effect on capital flows per capita. We find that 
institutional quality of countries not only directly affects the capital flows per capita, but also 
it has an effect on capital flows per capita through its impact on information flows. In particular, 
we find that countries with better institutional quality have higher levels of information flows. 
In other words, the existing literature which includes the institutional quality and information 
flows as determinants of capital flows in their regressions will underestimate the effect of 
institutions on capital flows per capita if their models do not account for indirect effect of 
institutions on capital flows per capita though its impact on information flows. We find that 
this indirect effect of institutions on capital flows through its impact on information flows is 
roughly equal to its direct effect, which demonstrates the economic relevance of this indirect 
link.  
Our results may have significant policy implications for policy makers of the 
developing and emerging countries. Our findings suggest that relatively poorer countries 
should improve both their institutional quality and also improve their access to worldwide 
information and promote investments in telecommunications infrastructure to attract long-term 
capital flows. In particular, improvement in institutional quality of countries would allow these 
countries to improve their access to worldwide information and investments in 
telecommunications infrastructure, which would then lead to higher flows of capital per capita.   
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In this paper, we also unbundle the effects of institutions and information flows on 
capital flows per capita. We find that a unit increase in the regulatory quality of countries has 
the largest effect on the increase of capital flows per capita, and the effects of other sub-
components of institutional quality on capital flows per capita in a decreasing order can be 
obtained by the improvements in political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
control of corruption, and voice and accountability. Hence, countries may prioritize the 
improvements in some aspects of institutional setting if their goal is to attract higher capital 
flows. Whereas, the governments should prioritize the improvements in internet infrastructure 
as increase in information flows through this channel leads to relatively larger increases in 
capital flows compared to other channels of information flows.  
Finally, previous studies found that the countries with better institutional quality and 
telecommunication infrastructure achieve higher levels of income per capita, however, they do 
not provide specific mechanisms. Our results suggest that information flows might be a channel 
through which institutions affect long-term development. Furthermore, our results also suggest 
that capital flows are also another channel through which both institutions and information 
flows affect long-run development. Hence, a future study analyzing the effects of institutional 
quality and infrastructure on economic development (growth) should incorporate these indirect 
channels to have more robust estimates for these factors’ effect on economic development 
(growth). 
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Fig. 1. Capital and information flows with the AKV sample 
 
Fig. 2. Capital and information flows with the large sample 
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Fig. 3. Capital and information flows with the AKV sample without rescaling capital flows data 
 
 
Fig. 4. Capital and information flows with the large sample without rescaling capital flows data 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics. 
 AKV Sample Large Sample 
Variables Mean SD Min Max Obs. Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
Capital flows per capita 597.26 1047.39 6.64 6755.58 60 738.31 2060.95 0.36 15993.70 120 
Information flows 5.76 1.55 2.54 8.79 60 4.85 1.95 1.43 8.79 118 
Average WGI 6.17 2.22 2.17 10.00 60 5.35 2.24 1.27 10.00 120 
log (GDP per capita in 1982) 8.87 1.04 5.49 10.71 60 8.36 1.24 5.49 11.44 120 
Schooling 7.81 2.21 3.52 12.59 59 6.80 2.72 1.23 12.59 110 
Distantness 8.41 2.27 5.57 14.52 60 8.20 1.87 5.57 14.52 119 
Financial openness 0.58 0.30 0.00 1.00 60 0.47 0.30 0.00 1.00 120 
All of the variables averaged over the period of analysis, i.e. between 1982 and 2011. 
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Table 2 
Replication of the AKV results with information flows. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log (GDP pc in 1982) 1.209*** 0.459*** 0.750** 0.553** 0.375** 0.159 0.224 
 (0.207) (0.163) (0.314) (0.264) (0.169) (0.189) (0.167) 
Institutions  0.525*** 0.382*** 0.459*** 0.450***  0.299*** 
  (0.0629) (0.132) (0.130) (0.0806)  (0.0882) 
Log (Schooling)     0.587 0.999 0.443 
     (0.585) (0.689) (0.593) 
Financial openness     0.341 0.711 0.276 
     (0.367) (0.462) (0.411) 
Log (Distantness)      -0.223 -0.378 -0.143 
     (0.369) (0.371) (0.355) 
Information flows      0.623*** 0.365*** 
      (0.125) (0.136) 
Observations 60 60 34 60 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.574 0.851 0.831 0.847 0.857 0.848 0.878 
Notes:   *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average inflows of portfolio equity 
and direct investment per capita. All regressions include a constant but not reported. 
 
Table 3 
Institutions, information flows and capital flows with large sample. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log (GDP pc in 1982) 1.437*** 0.823*** 0.821*** 0.822*** 0.516*** 0.224 0.291* 
 (0.114) (0.127) (0.313) (0.204) (0.134) (0.168) (0.153) 
Institutions  0.474*** 0.581*** 0.474*** 0.401***  0.236*** 
  (0.0660) (0.221) (0.127) (0.0717)  (0.0671) 
Log (Schooling)     0.729*** 0.471 0.415 
     (0.266) (0.338) (0.298) 
Financial openness     0.940** 1.411*** 0.899** 
     (0.395) (0.376) (0.416) 
Log (Distantness)      -0.192 -0.271 -0.170 
     (0.394) (0.384) (0.371) 
Information flows      0.602*** 0.402*** 
      (0.131) (0.139) 
Observations 120 120 68 120 109 108 108 
R-squared 0.673 0.789 0.761 0.789 0.809 0.812 0.826 
Notes:   *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average inflows of portfolio 
equity and direct investment per capita. All regressions include a constant but not reported. 
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Table 4  
Relationship between information flows and institutions. 
 AKV sample Large sample 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Institutions 0.463*** 0.462*** 0.441*** 0.528*** 
 (0.0647) (0.0988) (0.0631) (0.0698) 
Log (GDP pc in 1982) 0.469** 0.471** 0.760*** 0.649*** 
 (0.182) (0.218) (0.133) (0.132) 
First–stage F statistics  51.72  165.94 
Observations 60 60 118 118 
R-squared 0.816 0.816 0.835 0.830 
Notes:   *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Dependent variable is average information flows. All 
regressions include a constant but not reported. 
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Table 5 
Institutions, information flows and capital flows with different institutional quality proxies. 
Panel A. Institutions as explanatory variable. 
  VA GE PS RQ RL CC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log (GDP pc in 1982) 1.109*** 0.787*** 1.076*** 0.815*** 0.867*** 0.892*** 
 (0.123) (0.127) (0.123) (0.115) (0.139) (0.139) 
Institutions 0.283*** 0.471*** 0.376*** 0.504*** 0.417*** 0.375*** 
 (0.0517) (0.0619) (0.0739) (0.0630) (0.0629) (0.0572) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.743 0.790 0.750 0.802 0.770 0.761 
Panel B. Institutions and control variables as explanatory variables. 
Log (GDP pc in 1982) 0.637*** 0.504*** 0.531*** 0.569*** 0.508*** 0.462*** 
 (0.143) (0.135) (0.136) (0.129) (0.151) (0.141) 
Institutions 0.181*** 0.382*** 0.324*** 0.432*** 0.337*** 0.302*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0678) (0.0737) (0.0774) (0.0708) (0.0558) 
Log (Schooling) 0.900** 0.667** 1.062*** 0.620** 0.871*** 0.988*** 
 (0.345) (0.283) (0.285) (0.274) (0.310) (0.305) 
Financial openness 1.651*** 1.090*** 1.414*** 0.755* 1.155*** 1.167*** 
 (0.412) (0.407) (0.399) (0.448) (0.412) (0.362) 
Log (Distantness)  -0.413 -0.136 -0.512 -0.178 -0.0400 -0.300 
 (0.431) (0.386) (0.399) (0.372) (0.427) (0.408) 
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 
R-squared 0.772 0.806 0.800 0.813 0.796 0.794 
 Panel C. Institutions, information flows and control variables as explanatory variables. 
Log (GDP pc in 1982) 0.270 0.276* 0.258* 0.330** 0.256 0.234 
 (0.166) (0.154) (0.153) (0.153) (0.158) (0.160) 
Institutions 0.0740 0.212*** 0.207*** 0.251*** 0.176*** 0.139** 
 (0.0522) (0.0659) (0.0627) (0.0814) (0.0584) (0.0589) 
Log (Schooling) 0.399 0.372 0.522* 0.368 0.447 0.508 
 (0.318) (0.303) (0.309) (0.298) (0.318) (0.325) 
Financial openness 1.246*** 1.004** 1.065** 0.824* 1.025** 1.084*** 
 (0.389) (0.423) (0.409) (0.470) (0.419) (0.393) 
Log (Distantness)  -0.252 -0.136 -0.323 -0.160 -0.0794 -0.221 
 (0.381) (0.366) (0.364) (0.360) (0.389) (0.380) 
Information flows 0.539*** 0.422*** 0.459*** 0.393*** 0.460*** 0.474*** 
 (0.140) (0.141) (0.128) (0.145) (0.128) (0.151) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.815 0.824 0.830 0.826 0.822 0.819 
Notes:   *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average inflows of 
portfolio equity and direct investment per capita. All regressions include a constant but not reported. 
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Table 6  
Relationship between information flows and different proxies of institutions. 
Panel A. OLS Regressions of information flows on institutions 
  VA GE PS RQ RL CC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Institutions 0.291*** 0.440*** 0.303*** 0.468*** 0.390*** 0.363*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0599) (0.0685) (0.0629) (0.0588) (0.0532) 
Log (GDP pc in 1982) 0.988*** 0.726*** 1.038*** 0.760*** 0.798*** 0.804*** 
 (0.114) (0.133) (0.131) (0.126) (0.142) (0.137) 
Observations 118 118 118 118 118 118 
R-squared 0.803 0.836 0.773 0.846 0.815 0.812 
Panel B. 2SLS Regressions of information flows on institutions 
Institutions 0.366*** 0.542*** 0.521*** 0.626*** 0.495*** 0.425*** 
 (0.0584) (0.0761) (0.118) (0.0879) (0.0728) (0.0730) 
Log (GDP pc in 1982) 0.902*** 0.588*** 0.832*** 0.568*** 0.656*** 0.716*** 
 (0.116) (0.144) (0.165) (0.142) (0.149) (0.155) 
First–stage F statistics 129.39 150.63 69.07 128.76 179 131.26 
Observations 118 118 118 118 118 118 
R-squared 0.797 0.830 0.740 0.830 0.807 0.809 
Notes:   *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. Dependent variable is average information flows. All regressions include a constant but 
not reported. 
 
Table 7  
Direct and indirect effects of unit increases of different institutional quality proxies on log of capital flows per capita 
 VA GE PS RQ RL CC 
Direct effect on log capital 
flows per capita 0.000 0.212 0.207 0.251 0.176 0.139 
Indirect effect log capital 
flows per capita 0.197 0.229 0.239 0.246 0.228 0.201 
Total effect log capital 
flows per capita 0.197 0.441 0.446 0.497 0.404 0.340 
Total % increase in capital 
flows per capita  22% 55% 56% 64% 50% 41% 
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Table 8  
Unbundling the effect information flows on capital flows per capita. 
  AKV Sample Large Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Internet users  0.357**   0.365**   
 (0.164)   (0.158)   
TV shares  0.215***   0.176**  
  (0.0733)   (0.0704)  
International newspapers   0.0289   0.0691 
   (0.0470)   (0.0420) 
Log (GDP pc in 1982) 0.277* 0.199 0.371** 0.370*** 0.347*** 0.505*** 
 (0.143) (0.135) (0.173) (0.133) (0.127) (0.142) 
Institutions 0.334*** 0.377*** 0.429*** 0.286*** 0.354*** 0.379*** 
 (0.0941) (0.0779) (0.0852) (0.0727) (0.0705) (0.0684) 
Log (Schooling) 0.219 0.550 0.621 0.549* 0.466 0.767*** 
 (0.637) (0.557) (0.600) (0.283) (0.293) (0.286) 
Financial openness 0.279 0.317 0.332 0.640 0.839** 0.757** 
 (0.376) (0.391) (0.378) (0.424) (0.400) (0.355) 
Log (Distantness)  -0.221 -0.130 -0.225 -0.360 -0.0873 -0.179 
 (0.360) (0.357) (0.372) (0.371) (0.402) (0.389) 
Observations 59 59 59 108 108 101 
R-squared 0.867 0.883 0.858 0.815 0.819 0.810 
Notes:   *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average inflows of portfolio 
equity and direct investment per capita. All regressions include a constant but not reported. 
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Table 9 
Instrumental variable regressions of capital flows per capita on information flows. 
Panel A: Including the instrumental variable in baseline OLS regressions 
Dependent variable: log (Average capital flows per capita) 
 AKV sample Large Sample  
Information flows 0.860*** 0.815*** 
 (0.130) (0.138) 
Information flows in neighbouring countries 0.123 0.187 
 (0.111) (0.135) 
Observations 60 118 
R-squared 0.813 0.776 
Panel B: Second-stage regression, information flows instrumented  
Dependent variable: log (Average per capita capital flows) 
log (GDP per capita in 1982) 0.205 0.313 
 (0.347) (0.260) 
Information flows 0.889*** 0.831*** 
 (0.240) (0.174) 
Observations 60 118 
R-squared 0.816 0.787 
Panel C: First-stage regression of information flows on average information flow in neighbouring 
institutions  
Dependent variable: Average information flows 
log (GDP per capita in 1982) 0.553** 0.674*** 
 (0.251) (0.156) 
Information flows in neighbouring countries 0.519*** 0.561*** 
 (0.132) (0.093) 
Observations 60 118 
R-squared 0.682 0.804 
Notes:   *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis.  All regressions include a constant but not reported. 
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Table A1  
List of countries.  
Albania Ecuador* Kuwait* Qatar 
Algeria* Egypt* Laos Romania 
Angola El Salvador* Lebanon Rwanda 
Argentina* Ethiopia Lesotho Saudi Arabia* 
Australia* Finland* Liberia Senegal 
Austria* France* Madagascar Sierra Leone 
Bahrain Gabon Malawi Singapore* 
Bangladesh Gambia Malaysia* South Africa* 
Belgium Germany* Mali Spain* 
Benin Ghana Mauritania Sri Lanka* 
Bolivia* Greece Mauritius Sudan 
Botswana* Guatemala* Mexico* Swaziland 
Brazil* Guinea Mongolia Sweden* 
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Morocco* Switzerland 
Burkina Faso Honduras Mozambique Syria* 
Burundi Hong Kong Namibia Taiwan 
Cambodia Hungary Nepal Tanzania 
Cameroon India* Netherlands* Thailand* 
Canada* Indonesia* New Zealand* Togo 
Central African Rep. Iran Niger Trinidad & Tobago* 
Chad Iraq Nigeria Tunisia* 
Chile* Ireland Norway* Turkey* 
China* Israel* Oman* Uganda 
Colombia* Italy* Pakistan* United Kingdom* 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Ivory Coast* Panama* United States* 
Congo, Republic Jamaica* Paraguay* Uruguay* 
Costa Rica* Japan* Peru* Venezuela* 
Cyprus Jordan* Philippines* Vietnam 
Denmark* Kenya Poland Zambia 
Dominican Rep.* Korea* Portugal* Zimbabwe* 
Notes: Countries with asterisks (*) are the countries used in the AKV sample.    
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Table A2  
Definition of variables and their sources. 
Variable Definition Source 
Capital flows per capita Average inflows of portfolio equity and direct investment per capita between 
1982 and 2011.  
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
Available via: 
http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html  
Information flows This component is measured in terms of access to the internet, TV and foreign 
press products. In particular, it is calculated by using the data on the number of 
internet users (per 100 people), the share of households with a television set, and 
the sum of exports and imports in newspapers and periodicals (as a percentage of 
GDP). This index ranges between 0 and 10, where higher score means higher 
flows of information.  
Dreher, 2006. 
Available via: 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/  
Institutional quality This is a composite index that averages the six governance indicators from the 
World Governance Indicators (WGIs). The index is rescaled to range from 0 to 
10, where a higher score means better governance measure. 
WGIs - Kaufmann et al., 2013 
Available via: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home 
Voice and 
accountability 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. The index is rescaled to range from 0 
to 10, where a higher score means better governance measure. 
WGIs - Kaufmann et al., 2013 
Available via: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home 
Political Stability Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism. The index is rescaled to range from 0 to 10, where a 
higher score means better governance measure. 
WGIs - Kaufmann et al., 2013 
Available via: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home 
Government 
effectiveness 
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. The index is rescaled to range from 0 to 10, where 
a higher score means better governance measure. 
WGIs - Kaufmann et al., 2013 
Available via: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home 
Regulatory Quality Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. The index is rescaled to range from 0 to 10, where a higher score 
means better governance measure. 
WGIs - Kaufmann et al., 2013 
Available via: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home 
Rule of law Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. The index is rescaled to range from 0 to 10, where a higher score 
means better governance measure.  
WGIs - Kaufmann et al., 2013 
Available via: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home 
Control of corruption Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of 
the state by elites and private interests. The index is rescaled to range from 0 to 
10, where a higher score means better governance measure. 
WGIs - Kaufmann et al., 2013 
Available via: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home 
Distance Distance in thousands of kilometres from the capital city of the particular 
country to the capital cities of the other countries 
Mayer and Zignago, 2011 
Distantness measure The weighted average of the distances in thousands of kilometres from the 
capital city of the particular country to the capital cities of the other countries, 
using the total GDP shares of the other countries as weights, averages across a 
particular time period. 
Authors calculations 
Financial openness A measure of capital account liberalization where the index ranges between 0 
and 1, where higher score represents more open capital account. This index is 
based on IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. 
Chinn and Ito, 2006.  
Updated data available via: 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-
Ito_website.htm  
GDP per capita in 1982 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP per capita in 1982 from the Penn World 
Table 8.1. 
Feenstra et al., 2015. 
Schooling Average years of total schooling for population aged 15 and over. Data is 
available in 5-year intervals between 1950 and 2010.  
Barro and Lee, 2010. Available via: 
http://www.barrolee.com/  
 
 
